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Save the Slip for the Service Providers:
Courts Should Not Give Short Shrift to
the Safe Harbors of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act
By RAPHAEL A. GUTIPRREZ*
IN 1998, CONGRESS passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"),' with the hope that its provisions would bolster the devel-
opment of the Internet. In particular, Tite II granted service provid-
ers immunity from any type of copyright infringement to encourage
them to develop their services freely, without fear of liability for acts of
infringement that might occur on their systems.
To date, there have not been many cases in which entities have
claimed the protection of the safe harbors. However, in the cases that
have been decided, courts have interpreted the requirements very
strictly, thereby denying service providers the protection to which they
are entitled. Title II is extremely long and complicated, and courts
that have tackled it seem to have had a difficult time determining ex-
actly what is required of service providers. The result has been that
they are erring on the side of granting too much copyright protection.
This article suggests that to give effect to the intentions of Con-
gress, courts should read the safe harbors more liberally, in order to
grant the service providers protection and incentives to keep develop-
ing Internet related services. A step by step framework is also sug-
gested to help courts analyze claims of safe harbor protection by
entities that claim to be service providers.
I. Introduction to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 was a mammoth
piece of legislation that added a number of sections to the Copyright
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of 17 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1999).
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Act. The stated purpose of the DMCA was to "facilitate robust develop-
ment and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communica-
tions, research, development, and education in the digital age." 2
The DMCA is divided into four titles; each has its own purpose.
Title I implemented the new World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Ti-
tle II was designed to address safe harbor provisions for service
providers. Title III created a specific exemption in the copyright act
regarding rights of a computer owner or lessee. Tide IV was intended
to update the United States' copyright laws concerning library,
archive, and educational use of copyrighted works in the digital age.
This article will focus solely on Tide II, describing the elements of
its various subsections and analyzing how certain of those subsections
have been interpreted by the courts. Courts, in most circumstances,
have been overly cautious in applying Title II to service providers. At
the time of publication, no court has granted a service provider the
protection to which it is entitled under Title II. For sections that have
not been addressed by the courts, courts should give them a liberal
interpretation in order to further Congress's purpose in enacting Ti-
de II of the DMCA.
H. The Purposes of Section 512
Congress designed Title II of the DMCA ("Title II") to "pre-
serve[ ] strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners
to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take
place in the digital networked environment. '3 Congress also intended
Title II to give service providers more certainty as to their liability for
copyright infringement that occurred during their provision of In-
ternet services. 4
Tide II created a new section under Chapter 5 of the Copyright
Act, adding 17 U.S.C. Section 512.5 Congress wanted Section 512 to
limit service providers' liability for copyright infringement "for five
general categories of activity set forth in subsections (a) through (d)
and subsection (g).1"6 These limitations on liability are often referred
2. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1 (1998), reprinted in MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: Congressional Committee Reports on Amendments (2000) [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT].
3. Id. at 20.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Id. at 19.
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to as "safe harbors. '7 The first four safe harbors limit liability for any
qualifying "service provider ' 8 while the fifth provides immunity in cer-
tain circumstances for "good faith disabling of access to, or removal
of, material or activity claimed to be infringing or based on facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent."9 The Senate
Report makes clear that the safe harbors only apply if the service pro-
vider would otherwise be found liable under existing copyright princi-
ples. 10 In other words, the DMCA does not create any new standards
to determine liability (or a lack thereof) for copyright infringement.
Furthermore, section 512 is only a limitation on liability for
claims of copyright infringement. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes,1' the plaintiff brought suit under Title I of the DMCA, alleg-
ing that the defendants had circumvented a technological measure
designed to control access to its copyrighted works. 12 One of the de-
fendants argued that he was a service provider and attempted to rely
on section 512 of the DMCA to immunize himself from liability.1 3 The
court rejected this argument for two reasons. The first was that the
defendant offered no proof he was a service provider.1 4 But that was
unimportant in light of the court's second reason: "Section 512(c)
provides protection only from liability for copyright infringement.
[P] laintiffs seek to hold defendants liable.., for a violation of section
1201 (a) (2), which applies only to circumvention products and tech-
nologies." 15 Therefore, the court concluded that section 512 was
inapplicable. 16
The first four safe harbors, which will be described in more detail
below, limit liability for copyright infringement for different activities,
and will be referred to as the conduit safe harbor,'7 the system cach-
ing safe harbor, 18 the system storage safe harbor,19 and the informa-
7. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (Supp. 1998).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1).
10. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 40.
11. 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
12. See id. at 215.
13. See id. at 217.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (Supp. IV 1998). See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41
(1998): "Subsections (a)(1) through (5) limit the range of activities that qualify under this
subsection to ones in which a service provider plays the role of a 'conduit' for the commu-
nications of others."
18. See § 512(b).
19. See§512(c).
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tion location tools safe harbor.20 Each safe harbor has its own set of
requirements that must be met before it can be used. Subsection (n)
indicates the separate and independent functioning of each safe har-
bor. It states that a service provider's eligibility for one subsection
shall be based solely on the requirements of that particular subsec-
tion, and shall not affect a determination of whether it qualifies for
another subsection. 21 One district court gave effect to subsection (n)
by ruling that the potential applicability of one safe harbor would not
completely preclude application of another.22
III. Safe Harbor Protections Offered Service Providers
A. Protection from Monetary Damages
Any entity that qualifies for protection under one of the first four
safe harbors is immunized against monetary relief for any type of cop-
yright infringement: direct, vicarious, and contributory. This is evi-
dent from the language in the Senate Report23 and the fact that each
of the four sections begins with the language "[a] service provider
shall not be liable for monetary relief .... "24 The only definition
provided by the statute, other than "service provider," is for "monetary
relief," which, for the purposes of section 512 means "damages, costs,
attorneys' fees, and any other form of monetary payment."25
B. Limited Protection from Injunctions: Section 512(j)
The first four safe harbors also protect qualifying service provid-
ers, to a limited extent, from injunctive or any other type of equitable
relief.26 Subsection (j) of the statute sets out specific forms of injunc-
tive relief that a court may issue. Generally, a court may require a ser-
vice provider to either block access to an infringing site, or to
terminate the account of an infringing subscriber.27 If the entity quali-
fies for a safe harbor other than section 512(a), the court may also
grant such injunctive relief as it considers necessary to prevent or re-
20. See § 512(d).
21. See§ 512(n).
22. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1751 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
23. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 40 (1998).
24. § 512(a)-(d).
25. § 512(k)(2).
26. See §512(k).
27. See§ 512(j)(1)(A)-(B).
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strain copyright infringement, so long as that relief is the least bur-
densome to the service provider.28
Subsection (j)(2) gives the court considerations to take into ac-
count in issuing an injunction. Subsection (j) (3) lays out the require-
ment of notice that must be given to the service provider before an
injunction can be issued. A discussion of these subsections, however, is
beyond the scope of this paper.
IV. Two Definitions of "Service Provider" in
Section 512(k)(1)
Before a party can argue that its actions meet the requirements of
one of the safe harbors, it must first meet the definition of "service
provider," as service providers are the only entities protected under
section 512.29 Subsection (k) (1) defines "service provider" in two
ways, depending on which safe harbor is used.
A. The Broad Definition of Service Provider
The more broadly worded definition can be used to immunize
from liability entities that may not traditionally be thought of as ser-
vice providers.30 The Senate Judiciary Report states that the definition
was meant to cover providers of "services such as... Internet access, e-
mail, chat room and web page hosting," as well as "universities and
schools to the extent they perform the functions identified in subsec-
tion ([k]) (1) (B)." 3 1 Thus, providers of e-mail (such as Hotmail) 32 or
providers of web page hosting (such as GeoCities) 33 would be eligible
for protection from liability for copyright infringement.
B. The Narrow Definition of Service Provider
If an entity wants to claim the protections of the conduit safe har-
bor (section 512 (a)), a provision that limits liability for transitory digi-
tal network communications, that entity's activities must fall within the
scope of the "narrow definition" of service provider: "an entity offer-
28. See§ 512(j)(1)(A)(iii).
29. See § 512(a)-(d), (g).
30. See Casey Lide, What Colleges and Universities Need to Know About the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, available at http://www.educause.edu/ir/library/html/cem9913.htm
(last visited Apr. 29, 2001).
31. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 49.
32. See, e.g., Hotmail, available at http://www.hotmail.com (last visited Aug. 13, 2002).
33. See, e.g., Geocities, available at http://geocities.yahoo.com/home/ (last visited
Aug. 13, 2002).
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ing the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital
online communications, between or among points specified by a user,
of material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content
of material as sent or received." 34 For all of the other safe harbors,
however, the "broad definition" of "service provider" applies, which is
defined as "a provider of online services or network access, or the op-
erator of facilities therefore, and includes any entity described in [the
narrow definition of service provider]."35
The narrow definition was crafted in such a way as to recognize
that section 512(a) is a narrow limitation on liability, intended to pro-
tect only conduit activities. "This . . .definition is derived from the
definition of 'telecommunications' found in 47 U.S.C. § 153(48) in
recognition of the fact that the functions covered by this definition
are conduit activities."3 6 The legislative history demonstrates the lim-
ited scope of the definition by stating that while "hosting a World
Wide Website does not fall within the subsection ([k]) (1) (A) defini-
tion; providing connectivity for a [W] orld [W] ide [W] eb site does fall
within that definition."37 While the definition may be narrow, a pro-
vider which performs functions that fall both within and without the
narrow definition does not lose its eligibility for the safe harbor.38 It
can still claim the limitation on liability for the activities that fall
within the narrow definition.
To use an example from the Senate Report, imagine there is a
service provider, called SP, which provides connectivity for a World Wide
Web ("WWWA") site, called Site A. This activity would allow SP to come
within the narrow definition of service provider. Imagine that SP also
hosts some WWW sites, including Site B. This activity would fall outside
the narrow definition of service provider. Imagine further that SP
then becomes a defendant in a suit for copyright infringement regard-
ing material that appears on Site A. SP would still be able to use the
narrow definition of service provider and claim the conduit safe har-
bor since the activities in question allow it to meet that definition.
Thus, the fact that it does perform some activities that fall outside the
narrow definition, such as hosting Site B, is irrelevant, as long as those
activities do not involve the alleged copyright infringement at issue.
34. § 512(k)(1)(A).
35. § 512(k)(1)(B).
36. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 49.
37. Id.
38. See id.
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C. Application of the Narrow Definition of Service Provider in
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.3 9
In A &M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. ("Napster SJ"), the defendant,
Napster, attempted to rely on the conduit safe harbor in its motion for
summary judgment by asserting it was a service provider.411 In order to
use this safe harbor, Napster would have had to meet the narrow defi-
nition of service provider. The plaintiffs never challenged Napster's
ability to meet the narrow definition of service provider, and instead
only argued that Napster did not fulfill the requirements of the safe
harbor.41 Judge Patel thus assumed, without holding, that Napster was
a service provider under the narrow definition, since plaintiffs "ap-
pear[ed] to concede that Napster is a 'service provider' within the
meaning of subparagraph 512 (k) (1) (A)." 42
The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against Nap-
ster, which Judge Patel issued in a decision that will be referred to
here as Napster /43 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the grant of the prelim-
inary injunction in an opinion that will be referred to as Napster 114 4
In their brief to the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs challenged Napster's
status as a service provider. 45 The plaintiffs' argument, however,
rested on the fact that Napster did not provide access to the Internet,
like AT&T, nor did it function as a generalized search engine, like
Yahoo!. 46 The plaintiffs made no effort to show that Napster did not
fit one of the definitions of service provider under section 512(k).
39. 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1746 (BNA)(N.D. Cal. 2000).
40. Napster "designed and operate[d] a system which permit[ted] the transmission
and retention of sound recordings employing digital technology." A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011(9th Cir. 2001). Napster's system utilized software, avail-
able for free on its website, which allowed its users to copy audio compact discs ("CDs") as
MP3 files on their hard drives, to search for files on other users' computers, and to transfer
files to and from other users. See id. MP3 is a "standard file format for the storage of audio
recording in a digital format." Id. The software also provided chat rooms and directories
where artists could post information about their band or their music. The plaintiffs, who
were "engaged in the commercial recording, distribution and sale of copyrighted musical
compositions and sound recordings," sued Napster for contributory and vicarious copy-
right infringement.
41. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 n.5.
42. Id.
43. SeeA&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
44. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
45. See Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees at 8, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001)(Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403).
46. See id.
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In Napster II, the Ninth Circuit noted that the issue of whether
Napster was a service provider had never been resolved. 47 The court
found that "Napster's potential liability for contributory and vicarious
infringement [did not necessarily] render[ ] the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act inapplicable per se," because there were still significant
questions regarding the applicability of the safe harbors, including
whether Napster was an "Internet service provider as defined by 17
U.S.C. § 512(d)." 48 Several ambiguities inhere in the court's state-
ment, however. The term "service provider" is not defined in section
512(d). That section lists the requirements for the information loca-
tion tools safe harbor. Thus it is not clear whether the court is saying
there are questions as to whether Napster is a service provider, or
there are questions as to whether Napster can claim the protection of
section 512(d).
D. Definitions of Service Provider Should Be Interpreted Broadly
Congress intended to give broad protection to entities whose bus-
iness involves providing access to digital networks. The broad defini-
tion includes not only those entities that provide online services or
network access, but also those who operate the facilities required to
provide the online services or network access. 49
Most people familiar with the Internet would probably limit what
they consider to be a service provider to those entities that provide a
means for accessing the Internet, like America Online ("AOL"). How-
ever, Congress obviously intended to protect more entities than the
AOL-type providers. The Senate Report states that entities that pro-
vide users with e-mail or chat functions would be included in the defi-
nition as well as
"over-the-air broadcasting, whether in analog or digital form, or a
cable . . . or . . . satellite television service . . . to the extent it
provided users with online access to a digital network such as the
Internet, or it provides transmission, routing or connections to
connect material to such a network."
By interpreting these definitions broadly, and allowing entities
such as Napster to meet the definition of service provider, courts will
further the goal of Congress to clarify the liability of service providers
47. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
48. Id. The court noted that these issues would be more fully developed at trial. It
still affirmed the preliminary injunction, however, because the plaintiffs had demonstrated
that the balance of hardships tilted in their favor.
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k) (1) (B) (Supp. IV 1998).
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so they will not hesitate to "make the necessary investment in the ex-
pansion of the speed and capacity of the Internet."50
V. Safe Harbor Requirements
A. Requirements for All Safe Harbors: The Basic Requirements of
Section 512(i)
Before an entity is able to take advantage of any of the safe har-
bor provisions, section 512 (i) lists two requirements that must be met,
the "basic requirements." As stated in the Senate Report, "subsection
(i) imposes additional requirements on eligibility for any DMCA safe
harbor."51
1. Termination Policy
The first of the basic requirements is that the service provider
adopt and implement a policy providing for the termination of the
accounts of subscribers who engage in repeat copyright infringe-
ment.52 The service provider must also inform its subscribers that they
are subject to the termination provisions of the policy,5 3 so that "fla-
grant or repeat infringers 'know that there is a realistic threat of los-
ing [their] access.' ' '54
2. Accommodate Standard Technical Measures
The second requirement is that the service provider must accom-
modate and not interfere with standard technical measures used by
copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works.5 5 Examples
of such technical measures include digital watermarks or copyright
management systems. However, the service providers are only bound
to accommodate such technologies as long as those technologies "(A)
have been developed pursuant to a consensus of copyright owners and
service providers; . . . (B) are available to any person on reasonable
and nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) do not impose substantial costs
on the service provider or substantial burdens on its system or
network."56
50. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
51. Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
52. See§ 512 (i)(1)(A).
53. See id.
54. Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-551 (II), 1998
WL 414916, at *154).
55. See§ 512(i)(1)(B), (i)(2).
56. § 512(i)(2).
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3. Application of the Basic Requirements: Napster SJ
In opposition to Napster's summary judgment motion in Napster
SJ, the plaintiffs alleged that Napster had failed to meet the first of
these basic requirements. 57
a. Adoption of Termination Policy
The plaintiffs claimed that Napster did not adopt a written policy
of which its users had notice until after the lawsuit was filed. 58 Napster
tried to refute this allegation by noting that the statute does not spec-
ify a certain time for the service provider to adopt the policy. 59 The
court noted that while this was true on its face, it would not be logical
to make the copyright compliance policy a prerequisite for all safe
harbors, yet allow a service provider to adopt such a policy after a
lawsuit had been filed. If that were true, the defendant in a copyright
suit could simply say it had developed a formal policy after the lawsuit
had been filed, and thereby avoid monetary liability for copyright in-
fringements that occurred before developing the policy. 60 Moreover,
the court concluded, for summary judgment purposes Napster would
have to produce some proof that it had satisfied the requirements of
subsection (i), not simply state that it had done so. 61 While courts
should interpret section 512 broadly, this court was correct in not in-
terpreting the statute too broadly so as to allow the service provider to
read an absurdity into the statute.
b. Implementation of Termination Policy
The plaintiffs also argued that Napster failed to meet the require-
ments of subsection (i) because, even after Napster did adopt a copy-
right compliance policy, it did not reasonably implement it.6 2 Once
Napster was formally notified of users engaging in infringing activity,
it would block only their passwords and not their internet protocol
addresses. 63 The plaintiffs alleged this was insufficient because users
could easily sign on again under a new user identification and pass-
word. They claimed that Napster purposefully kept itself ignorant of
57. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1752.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 1752-53.
60. See id. at 1753.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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its users' identities and addresses so Napster could disclaim any liabil-
ity for copyright infringement. 64
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had produced enough
"evidence that Napster's copyright compliance policy is neither timely
nor reasonable within the meaning of subparagraph 512(i) (A)" to de-
feat Napster's summary judgment motion. 65 The Ninth Circuit agreed
that there were significant questions as to whether Napster fulfilled
the requirements of section 512(i). 66
4. Issues with the Basic Requirements: Websites That Do Not
Require User Subscription
One issue that has been discussed with regard to the basic re-
quirements is whether or not a website that does not require its users
to subscribe would still be able to claim the protections of the section
512 safe harbor provisions. As the Napster SJ court noted, a debate
continues over how reasonable or easy it is to block specific internet
protocol addresses, i.e. specific computers, from accessing a website or
a particular service. 67 Most websites visited today, such as Yahoo.com
or MSNBC.com do not require passwords, or require them only for
limited functions, such as accessing e-mail.
Given Congress's intent to grant a broad scope of protection,
website operators that do not require passwords should be found to
meet the basic requirement as long as they notify users that any in-
fringing material they posted to the website will be removed. Website
operators that actually remove infringing material upon receiving
proper notice should not be held liable for copyright infringement.
B. The Conduit Safe Harbor: Section 512(a)
The conduit safe harbor insulates a service provider from copy-
right infringement liability for transitory digital network communica-
tions, which are comprised of "transmitting, routing, or providing
connections for, material through a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the intermedi-
ate and transient storage of that material in the course of such trans-
mitting, routing, or providing connections."68 An entity attempting to
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
67. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1753 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
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claim the protection of this safe harbor must meet the narrow defini-
tion of service provider and the five elements discussed below.
1. Five Elements
There are five elements that must be satisfied for the conduit safe
harbor to apply: (1) the transmission of material must be initiated by a
person other than the service provider; (2) the transitory digital net-
work communication must be carried out through an automatic tech-
nical process; (3) the service provider must not select the recipients of
the material; (4) no copy of the material made by the service provider
can be available to anyone other than the intended recipients; and (5)
the material is transmitted through the system or network without
modification of its content.69
2. Application of the Conduit Safe Harbor: Napster SJ
In deciding Napster's motion for summary judgment, the Napster
SJcourt seemed to read a sixth element into the statute by requiring
that transmitting, routing, or providing connections literally pass
through Napster's servers. 70 The court relied on the fact that the pref-
atory language of section 512(a) states that a service provider is free
from liability for "transmitting, routing, or providing connections for,
material through a system or network."' 71 It concluded that since the nar-
row definition "service provider" from section 512(k) (1) (A) did not
include the words "through a system or network," section 512(a) im-
posed an additional requirement. 72
a. Transmitting Material
The Napster SJ court held that transmissions do not pass through
Napster's servers because Napster admitted that transmitted files pass
through the Internet, directly from one user's computer to an-
other's. 73 Napster then tried to argue that its system consisted not only
of its servers, but also of the MusicShare browsers that its users had
downloaded onto their computers.7 4 The court rejected this argu-
ment, but held that even if "the system includes the browser on each
user's computer, the MP3 files are not transmitted 'through' the sys-
69. See§ 512(a)(1)-(5).
70. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1751.
71. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)).
72. See id. at 1749.
73. See id. at 1751.
74. See id.
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tem within the meaning of subsection 512(a);" instead, the court
found that they are transmitted "from one part of the system to an-
other, or between parts of the system. 75
b. Providing Connections for Material
The court also held that Napster did not provide a connection
"through" its servers.76 Napster argued, and plaintiffs admitted, that
Napster's central server provided requesting users' browsers with the
host users' 77 Internet Protocol address information. 78 This, in turn,
enabled a connection between the two computers, comprising the
"'value of the system to the users and the public.' 79 Therefore, Nap-
ster argued, a connection was made through its system. The plaintiffs
did not provide any evidence to rebut Napster's assertion. "Neverthe-
less, the court [found] that Napster does not provide connections
'through' its system." 80
c. Routing Material
Then, despite the fact that "[n]either party ha[d] adequately
briefed the meaning of 'routing' in subsection 512(a)," and the "legis-
lative history [did not] shed light on this issue," the court went on to
hold that "routing does not occur through the Napster system." '81 The
deepest the court dove into the analysis of "routing" was rejecting
Napster's argument that "Napster's server routes the transmission by
providing the Host's address to the Napster browser that is installed
on and in use in User l's computer."82 The court's main reason for
rejecting Napster's assertion was that Napster tried to make "routing"
seem too much like "providing connections," and Congress would not
use those phrases disjunctively if they were intended to have similar
meanings. 83
The court proceeded to extrapolate a definition of "routing"
from the parties' submissions, notwithstanding its observation of de-
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1752.
77. The host is the person who has the desired file.
78. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747, 1752.
79. Id. at 1751-52.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees at 8, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)(Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403)).
83. Id.
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fendant's apparently contradictory uses of the word.84 It would seem
rash for the court to admit a lack of information regarding "routing"
yet base its holding on what seemed to be mere speculation and con-
jecture drawn from the parties' briefs.
d. The Reading of the Conduit Safe Harbor Was Too Strict
(1) A Strict Interpretation Will Stifle New Technologies
Such a strict reading of the statute defeats the purpose of the
statute to "facilitate the robust development . ..of electronic com-
merce, communications, [and] research."8 Shawn Fanning, one of
the founders of Napster, created the Napster system using peer-to-
peer architecture.86 Peer-to-peer networks allow users to transmit files
directly to each other, rather than having to send them through a
central server first, and are generally simpler in nature than other
types of networks.8 7 Fanning's purpose in designing this system was to
solve the problems his roommate encountered when looking for mu-
sic files on the Internet.
Ordinary search engines in existence at that time searched the
Internet periodically, and updated their indexes maybe every hour or
so to remove sites that were down or unavailable. During the time in
between each search, the indexes would become out of date as sites
went up or down. Fanning's purpose in creating the peer to peer net-
work was to have a system whose index reflected only sites that were
immediately available. Users all connected to the central server and
chose which files they wanted to share with others. Once a user signed
off the system, the index immediately reflected that by taking that
user's files off the system.
Fanning's design was unique and programmed specifically to
combat certain problems encountered when looking for files on the
Internet. By requiring the files to literally pass through Napster's serv-
ers, the court's ruling stifles the development of new technologies
whose purpose is to make searching the Internet a smoother ride.
84. See id. The court noted that "Napster sometimes appears to recognize a distinc-
tion between the two terms. For example, it states that 'the system provides remote users
with connection to each other and allows them to transmit and route the information as
they choose."' Id. at n.7 (quoting defendant's reply brief).
85. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
86. Shawn Fanning's declaration, available at http://www.napster.com/pressroom/le-
gal.html (last visited April 29, 2001).
87. See Webopedia, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/peer-to-peerarchitec
ture.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2001).
[Vol. 36
SAFE HARBORS FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS
Thus, the court essentially punished Fanning for choosing a more effi-
cient architecture for his system.
(2) A Strict Interpretation Bars Activities the Statute Should Reach
The court's strict interpretation also seems to contravene Con-
gress's intentions as to what types of activity the statute is supposed to
reach. The Senate Report states that "[s]ubsection (a) applies to ser-
vice providers transmitting, routing, or providing connections for ma-
terial and some forms of intermediate and transient storage of
material in the course of performing these functions."88 There is no
express requirement that material pass through a server.
Additionally, the language of the fifth requirement of section
512(a), that "the material is transmitted through the system or net-
work without modification of its content," includes the word
"through."89 Yet, the Senate Report's summary of the elements states
that the fifth element requires that "the content (but not necessarily
the form) of the material is not modified in the course of transmis-
sion."90 There is no mention of the word "through," indicating Con-
gress was more concerned about the interpretation of the word
"modification." Further demonstrating that concern, the example
given in the report demonstrates that altering the form of the mate-
rial, such as changing bold face type to normal, will not count as a
modification. 91 Again there is no reference to the "through" element
the court seems to read into the statute.
The court's insertion of a requirement that the material literally
pass through the system for a service provider to claim the protection
of the conduit safe harbor is overly strict. It will stifle development of
Internet technologies and exclude an activity Congress intended to
cover with the statute.
88. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41.
89. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (5) (Supp. IV 1998).
90. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 42.
91. See id
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C. Additional Requirement for the System Caching, System
Storage, and Information Location Tools Safe Harbors:
A Designated Agent
To claim the protection of the system caching,92 system storage,93
or information location tools94 safe harbors, a service provider must
have an agent designated to receive notifications of alleged infringe-
ment.95 The service provider must submit to the Copyright Office
"substantially the following information: (A) the name, address,
phone number, and electronic mail address of the agent [and] (B)
other contact information which the Register of Copyright may deem
appropriate. '96 The same information must also be available through
its service, and posted on its website (if it has one) in a location acces-
sible to the public. 97
This requirement obviously applies to section 512(c), the system
storage safe harbor, because subsection (2) states that the designated
agent is a requirement for the "limitations on liability established in
this subsection [to] apply to a service provider."98 The requirement also
applies to the system caching and information location tools safe
harbors because each references section 512(c)(3).99 Section
512(c) (3), discussed in greater detail below, outlines the elements a
notification must substantially contain in order for it be considered
"effective" notice of copyright infringement. 00 "To be effective under
[§ 512(c) (3)], a notification of claimed infringement must be a writ-
ten communication provided to the designated agent of a service pro-
vider."'o 1 Thus, the cross references of the statute impose an
additional requirement on three of the safe harbors to make available
an agent to receive complaints of alleged copyright infringement.
D. The System Caching Safe Harbor: Section 512(b)
Caching occurs when a system creates a "temporary storage area
for frequently-accessed or recently-accessed data ... [to] speed[ ] up
92. See § 512(b).
93. See§ 512(c).
94. See§ 512(d).
95. See§ 512(c) (2).
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. See § 512(b)(2)(E), (d)(3).
100. See § 512(c) (3). A service provider incurs additional obligations upon receipt of
effective notice. See§ 512 (b)(2)(E), (c)(1)(C), (d)(3).
101. § 512(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
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the operation of the computer." 10 2 Thus, when a service provider cre-
ates a cache file, it stores Internet material on its own servers. A service
provider will usually cache Internet sites frequently visited by its users
in order to speed up the transmission of information from those sites.
By speeding up the transmission, congestion on the server is de-
creased. Systems are normally designed to update their cached files
automatically.
Section 512(b) consists of eight requirement that must be met,
and is divided into two parts: the first three requirements describe the
actions to which the limitation on liability applies' 0 3 and the last five
requirements describe conditions that must be met to claim that
limitation.1 0 4
1. Actions That Qualify for Limitation on Liability
A limitation on liability for copyright infringement is provided for
the "intermediate and temporary storage of material on a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider" in a
specific situation which is described by the statute.10 5
The statute first states that the material must be made available by
a person other than the service provider. 10 6 For simplicity's sake, this
"person other than the service provider" will be referred to as the
"originator." The material must then be transmitted through the sys-
tem from the originator to a user (i.e., a person other than the origi-
nator) at the user's request. 10 7 After such a transmission, any
temporary storage of the originator's material on the system must oc-
cur by means of an automatic technical process in order to make that
material available to other users who request access. 108
For example, SP is a service provider. 0, an originator, posts an
infringing copy of a magazine article on a website, Site A. A user of
SP's system accesses Site A, and the infringing material is transmitted
through SP's system to the user. Ten other users of SP's system also
access Site A. In order to speed up transmissions to its users, SP de-
signed its system to automatically make a cache file of any website that
is visited by 5 or more users. Thus, in the situation just described, SP
102. Computeruser.com, at http://www.computeruser.com/resourcesdictionary/in-
dex.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2001).
103. See§ 512(b)(1).
104. See§ 512(b) (2).
105. §512(b)(1).
106. See § 512(b) (1) (A).
107. See § 512(b)(1)(B).
108. See§ 512(b)(1)(C).
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would not be liable for copyright infringement that occurred on Site
A, provided the remaining five requirements are met.
2. Conditions for Qualification
Five additional conditions apply to the system caching safe har-
bor. The first, and arguably most important, is that the material can-
not be modified after its initial transmission. 10 9 Second, the service
provider must comply with a generally accepted industry standard
protocol regarding rules concerning refreshing, reloading, or other
updating of the material. 110 Those rules, however, must not prevent
or unreasonably impair the intermediate storage of the material. 11'
Third, the service provider must not interfere with the ability of tech-
nology to return to the originator information that would have been
collected had the material been accessed on the originating, rather
than the cached, site. 112 This includes information such as the num-
ber of "hits" 3 on the site and any data entered by users of the site.
Fourth, if the originator has conditions that must be met before a user
can access the material, such as a password or fee, the service provider
must also require that those conditions to be met." 4
The last requirement is somewhat complicated and is best ex-
plained in two parts: as an the obligation of the service provider, and
as a situation in which the service provider becomes subject to the
obligation. If the service provider receives proper notice" 5 from the
copyright owner (or her agent) that the material posted is infringing,
the service provider must remove or block access to that material. 116
However, the service provider must only do so if the party giving noti-
fication confirms 17 that the allegedly infringing material has actually
been removed, or a court has ordered it to be removed, from the
originating site.118
The following example is illustrative: Suppose "Holder" is the
holder of the copyright in "Picture." Originator posts an infringing
109. See § 512(b) (2) (A).
110. See § 512(b) (2) (B).
111. See id.
112. See § 512(b) (2) (C).
113. This is the number of people who access a website.
114. See § 512(b) (2) (D).
115. See Part VI, below for a further discussion and details.
116. See § 512(b) (2) (E). For the sake of simplicity in explaining the statutory provi-
sions, any further references in this paper to removal of allegedly infringing material will
also include blocking access to that material, unless otherwise specified.
117. See§ 512(b)(2)(E)(ii).
118. See§ 512(b)(2)(E)(i).
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copy of Picture on Site A. Several of the users of SP's system have
accessed Picture on Site A, so SP's system has automatically made a
cache file of Site A. Assuming the first four safe harbor conditions
have been met, SP is now under an obligation to remove the infring-
ing material from its system upon receiving proper notice from
Holder that Originator has posted an infringing copy of Picture on
Site A. However, SP is only subject to this obligation if Holder con-
firms that the infringing copy of Picture has actually been removed
(or has been ordered by a court to be removed) from Site A.
There have not yet been any cases involving this particular safe
harbor. Presumably, however, it is not applicable when a service pro-
vider mirrors a particular site. When a site is mirrored, the service
provider selectively, as opposed to automatically, decides to store a
particular website on its server.119 Since it does not occur automati-
cally, mirroring would not appear to be the type of caching the statute
is designed to protect.120
E. System Storage and Information Location Tools Safe Harbors
While they are intended to cover different activities, the system
storage and the information location tools safe harbors essentially
share the same requirements. The system storage safe harbor limits
liability for copyright infringement for "the storage at the direction of
a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider." 121 This includes "providing
server space for a user's website, for a chat room, or other forum in
which material may be posted at the direction of users." 122
The information location tools safe harbor limits liability for cop-
yright infringement for "referring or linking users to an online loca-
tion containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using
information location tools, including a directory, index, reference,
pointer, or hypertext link."'123
119. See Matisse.net, at http://www.matisse.net/flies/glossary.html#P (last visited Aug.
13, 2002).
120. See§512(b)(1)(C).
121. §512(c)(1).
122. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 43.
123. § 512(d).
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1. System Storage and Information Location Tools Safe Harbor
Requirements
The first requirement is directed at the knowledge standard of
the service provider regarding copyright infringement.124 The statute
lays out three possible levels of awareness of the infringing material or
activity for which the service provider can claim the safe harbor.
One possibility is that the service provider lacks actual knowledge
of the infringing material or activity. 125 A second possibility under
which a service provider can claim the safe harbor is when it has no
knowledge of any facts or circumstances from which infringing activity
is apparent.126 This is referred to as the "red flag" test. 127 The service
provider is not under an obligation to monitor or actively seek out
infringing material on its service, but if it becomes aware of "a 'red
flag' from which infringing activity is apparent, it will lose the limita-
tion of liability if it takes no action."128 Whether or not the facts consti-
tute a "red flag" is an objective determination, even though a
subjective analysis of the service provider's awareness can help deter-
mine whether the service provider was aware of the facts. 129 The third
possibility is where the service provider obtains the aforementioned
knowledge or awareness. In that instance, it may still claim the safe
harbor as long as it "acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material." 130
The second requirement is that, where the service provider has
the right and ability to control the infringing activity, it cannot receive
a financial benefit that is directly attributable to that activity.' 3' The
third requirement obligates a service provider to remove or block ac-
cess to allegedly infringing material upon receipt of proper notice
from the copyright holder or her agent.' 3 2 The party who posted the
material may, in some cases, contest removal of the material. While
the details of the service provider's responsibilities in such a situation
are beyond the scope of this paper, they can be found in section
512(g).
124. See§512(c)(1)(A), (d)(1).
125. See § 512(c) (1)(A) (i), (d) (1) (A).
126. See§ 512(c) (1)(A) (ii), (d)(1)(B).
127. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 44.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), (d)(1)(C).
131. See§512(c)(1)(B), (d)(2).
132. See§512(c)(1)(C), (d)(3).
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2. The Vicarious Liability Conundrum
The Copyright Act does not impose liability on one party for an-
other party's acts, i.e. there is no provision for secondary copyright
infringement.1 33 Thus, courts developed two doctrines of secondary
infringement: vicarious and contributory infringement. An individual
or other entity can be held liable for vicarious copyright infringement
for (1) having the ability to control the activity of the direct infringer
and (2) receiving a financial benefit from that activity.' 3 4
The system storage and information location tools safe harbors
lay out the "circumstances under which a service provider would lose
the protection of subsection (c) [or subsection (d)] by virtue of its
benefit from and control over the infringing activity."'1 35 This excep-
tion makes it seem that neither of these safe harbors shelters vicarious
copyright infringers.
a. The Control Prong
One commentator argues that "[a] narrow construction of the
codified control prong can . . . salvage protection for qualifying ser-
vice providers."' 36 He argues that Title II of the DMCA can be recon-
ciled with common law vicarious liability by reading actual control, as
opposed to legal control, into the statute.1 37
Wright points out that there have been two approaches to the
control prong of the vicarious liability test.138 The narrow approach
requires that the alleged vicarious infringer have actual control, and
looks primarily at the "defendant's ongoing ability to prevent the ac-
tual infringement."' 39 To be liable for vicarious copyright infringe-
ment, the defendant must be in a position so that she can actually take
action to prevent infringement. 140
133. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A]
(2000).
134. See id. at § 12.04[A] [1].
135. SENATE REPoRT, supra note 2, at 44.
136. Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious Liability for Copyright
Infringement Into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1007
(2000).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1012. Wright's article focuses solely on the language of the system stor-
age safe harbor in § 512(c) (1) (B). Since the language of the information location tools
safe harbor in § 512(d) (2) is identical, Wright's arguments can be expanded to apply to
the latter section, too.
139. Id. at 1013 (citation omitted).
140. See id. at 1016.
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The broader approach requires simply legal control, which will
find "control in every legal relationship in which one party reserves,
implicitly or explicitly, control over the infringer." 141 Thus, a party
with potential rather than actual control over the direct infringer can
be vicariously liable for copyright infringement, making the control
prong appear as if it is a mere formality.142
Wright suggests that courts should read section 512(c) (1) (B) to
require actual control. 143 He argues that the text of the statute, its
structure, and the legislative history all support an actual control re-
quirement. 44 If the statute is read to require only legal control, pro-
tection for vicariously liable service providers would be eliminated. 45
The only service provider who would be able to claim the safe harbor
would be one who had either no ability to control the direct infringer,
or one who realized no economic benefit from the infringer's acts. 146
However, a service provider lacking either control or a financial bene-
fit would not need the safe harbor, as it could not be found vicariously
liable for copyright infringement anyway. 147
Furthermore, other requirements of subsections 512(c) and
512(i) are analogous to the findings of control that courts have made
when holding a vicarious infringer liable under the legal control stan-
dard. 48 Section 512(c) (2) requires that the service provider have a
designated agent available to receive notifications of alleged infringe-
ment. In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,1 49
the court found the defendant was vicariously liable because it exhib-
ited the requisite control from its ability to police the infringing activ-
ity. Therefore, a service provider in compliance with section 512(c) (2)
could be found to have lost the protection of the information location
tools or system storage safe harbor if § 512(c) (1) (B) is read to require
only legal control.150
Additionally, section 512(i) requires that the service provider im-
plement a policy of terminating the accounts of repeat infringers. In
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,5 the court found that contractual
141. Id. at 1012.
142. See id. at 1016.
143. See id. at 1026.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 1028.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1029.
148. See id. at 1029-31.
149. 443 F.2d 1159, 1163 (2d Cir. 1971).
150. See Wright, supra note 134, at 1007.
151. 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996).
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control was sufficient for a finding of vicarious liability. Thus, a court
applying the legal control standard would find that a service provider
that complied with section 512 (i) would not be able to claim the infor-
mation locations tools or system storage safe harbor. Looking at these
possible outcomes, it would not make sense that a requirement for a
service provider to claim the proection of a safe harbor would simulta-
neously prevent the service provider from claiming the desired
protection.
b. The Financial Benefit Prong
Courts should also be careful to not read the financial benefit
element of section 512(c) (1) (B) too strictly. If courts find the service
provider is financially benefiting from the infringement, the service
provider can not claim the benefit of either the system storage or the
information location tools safe harbors. In its discussion of section
512(c) (1) (B), the Senate Report indicated that Congress did not in-
tend this section to be interpreted too narrowly. "In determining
whether the financial benefit criterion is satisfied, courts should take a
common-sense, fact-based approach, not a formalistic one."' 52 Thus,
subsection 512(c) (1) (B) was not intended to banish from its protec-
tion a service provider conducting a legitimate business.
For example, charging all users a one-time set-up fee or a flat
periodic payment for the provider's services would not mean that the
service provider was deriving a financial benefit from any infringing
activity that might occur on its system. Neither would charging user
fees based on the length of the message they posted or by the amount
of time they were connected to the service. 153 In contrast, fees
charged where the value of the service depends on providing access to
infringing material would eliminate the service provider's safe harbor
protection.154
Therefore, courts should read sections 512(c)(1)(B) and
512 (d) (2) as requiring the service provider to have actual control over
the direct infringer before the service provider loses the protection of
either safe harbor. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[w]e need
not accept a blanket conclusion that § 512 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act will never protect secondary infringers."' 155 Addition-
ally, courts should recognize assessed user charges do not necessarily
152. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 44.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
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mean the service provider is receiving a financial benefit from any
infringement that might occur on its system.
VI. Effective Notice Under Section 512(c)(3)
As noted above, a service provider that receives proper notice of
alleged copyright infringement becomes subject to another require-
ment if it wishes to claim the protection of the system caching, system
storage, or information location tools safe harbors. Specifically, it
must remove or disable access to the allegedly infringing material, and
provide proper notice of the alleged infringement. 156 In order to con-
stitute proper notification, the notice must be written and "include[ ]
substantially the following"1 57 elements.
A. Elements of Proper Notice
1. Verification Requirements
Three of the six elements of proper notice relate to verification
of the person filing the notice (the "complainant"). The verification
elements include a requirement that the notice be signed, physically
or electronically, by a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner
of the allegedly infringed right. 158 The complainant must also include
a written statement that he has a "good faith belief that the use of the
material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copy-
right owner, its agent, or the law."'159 The final verification element
requires the complainant to include an affidavit stating that the infor-
mation in the notice is accurate, and a statement under penalty of
perjury that the complainant is authorized to act on behalf of the
owner of the allegedly infringed copyright. 160 Note that the complaint
itself need not be made under oath.
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E), (c)(1)(C), (d)(3). "Subsection (b)[(2)(E)] estab-
lishes a notification and take down procedure for cached material modeled on the proce-
dure under subsection (c)" with certain exceptions, as discussed above in Part V.C. See also
SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 43. "Subsection (d) incorporates the notification and take
down structure of subsection (c) and applies it to the provision of references and links to
infringing sites." SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 47.
157. §512(c)(3)(A).
158. See§ 512(c) (3)(A) (i).
159. § 512(c) (3) (A) (v).
160. See§ 512(c)(3)(A)(vi).
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2. Identification Requirements
The other three elements of proper notification (the "identifica-
tion requirements"), require the complainant to give the service pro-
vider enough information to be able to identify: (1) the allegedly
infringed work,161 (2) the allegedly infringing work,162 and (3) the
complainant. 163 If several works from a single website are allegedly
infringed, one notification for all of them is sufficient if it contains a
representative list of those works. 164
When the complainant identifies the allegedly infringing work,
i.e. the work she would like removed, she must supply the service pro-
vider with sufficient information to locate the allegedly infringing ma-
terial. 165 In the case of the information location tools safe harbor, this
element requires the notice to identify the "reference or link[ ] to
material or activity claimed to be infringing ... and information rea-
sonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate that refer-
ence or link. "166
Finally, the complainant must include in the notice reasonably
sufficient information to allow the service provider to contact him,
such as an address, telephone number, or e-mail address.1
67
3. Substantial Compliance
The statute provides that if the notice fails to substantially comply
with the listed elements, it shall not be considered in determining
whether the service provider had actual knowledge of infringing activ-
ity or was aware of facts from which infringing activity was apparent.
168
As discussed previously, actual knowledge of infringement or aware-
ness of facts from which infringing activity is apparent precludes a ser-
vice provider from claiming the protection of either the system
storage or the information location tools safe harbors.' 69
However, the introductory language of section 512(c) (3) (A)-
that the notification need only comply "substantially" with the listed
elements-and the provisions of section 512(c)(3)(B)(ii) indicate
that there need not be strict compliance with all six elements. Indeed,
161. See § 512(c)(3) (A) (ii).
162. See § 512(c) (3) (A) (iii).
163. See § 512(c) (3) (A) (iv).
164. See § 512(c) (3) (A) (ii).
165. See § 512(c) (3) (A) (iii).
166. § 512(d)(3).
167. See § 512(c) (3) (A) (iv).
168. See § 512(c) (3) (B) (i).
169. See § 512(c)(1)(A), (d)(1)
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the latter provides that if the notice complies substantially with the
identification requirements, it will be sufficient to put the service pro-
vider on notice of the alleged infringement.
B. "Substantial Compliance" Applied: ALS Scan v. RemarQ
Communities, Inc.170
The Fourth Circuit dealt with such a "substantial compliance" is-
sue in ALS Scan, Inc. The plaintiff, ALS Scan, displayed its copyrighted
adult photos on the Internet to paying customers and sold them on
CD ROMs and videotapes.1 71 The defendant, RemarQ was an "online
Internet service provider" providing access to over 30,000 newsgroups
for its subscribers. 172 Two of the newsgroups on RemarQ's service in-
corporated ALS Scan's name in their titles and contained hundreds of
images that infringed ALS Scan's copyrights. 173 The postings were
placed there by subscribers.
When plaintiff discovered its copyrights were being infringed, it
sent the defendant a cease and desist letter, requesting that the defen-
dant stop carrying the two newsgroups. 174 The letter identified the
newsgroups, a web address where plaintiffs models could be found,
and a web address where its copyright information could be found.175
RemarQ responded that it would not cease carrying the newsgroups,
but would remove individual infringing items if ALS Scan specifically
identified them. 176 Rather than identify the allegedly infringing items,
ALS Scan responded by stating that there were 10,000 of its copy-
righted images on RemarQ's system, and that the two newsgroups ap-
peared to have been created solely for the purpose of posting and
distributing ALS Scan's copyrighted images. 177 After failed negotia-
tions between the parties, ALS Scan filed suit for copyright infringe-
ment, claiming that RemarQ had both actual and constructive
knowledge of the infringing material. The latter claim was based on
the notice ALS Scan gave to RemarQ.178
170. 239 F.3d. 619 (4th Cir. 2001).
171. See id. at 620.
172. Id. In this case, as in Napster Summary Adjudication, the plaintiff did not challenge
the defendant's status as a service provider. See id. at 623.
173. See id. at 620. The newsgroups were entitled "alt.als" and "alt.binaries.pictures.
erotica.als."
174. See id.
175. See id. at 620-21.
176. See id. at 621.
177. See id.
178. See id.
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RemarQ filed a motion to dismiss and in the alternative, for sum-
mary judgment, claiming that it was protected by the DMCA's system
storage safe harbor.179 It claimed that it did not have knowledge of
the infringement because ALS Scan failed to comply with the notice
requirements of section 512(c) (3) (A).""' The district court ruled for
the defendant, finding that RemarQ was not liable for contributory
infringement because ALS Scan's notice did not comply with the re-
quired notice provision. 81
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that ALS Scan substantially
complied with the notice requirement, thus obligating RemarQ to re-
move the infringing material.18 2 Since RemarQ failed to do so, it did
not meet the third element of the system storage safe harbor, and,
therefore, could not claim its protection.18 3
The court reasoned that, for the purposes of the statute, it was
sufficient for ALS Scan to provide RemarQ with information (1) iden-
tifying two newsgroups that it alleged were created for the sole pur-
pose of publishing ALS Scan's copyrighted works; (2) claiming that
the two newsgroups consisted almost exclusively of ALS Scan's copy-
righted material; and (3) referring RemarQ to two web addresses
where it could find pictures of ALS Scan's models and copyright infor-
mation. 184 The court also found persuasive ALS Scan's claim that all
of its material contained ALS Scan's name and/or copyright
symbol. 18 5
According to the court, this information substantially complied
with the requirement that ALS Scan provide "a representative list of
infringing material as well as information reasonably sufficient to en-
179. See id. at 621, 623.
180. See id. at 622.
181. See id. at 621-22. It is not clear whether the court granted the motion to dismiss
or the motion for summary judgment. The district court stated that it was treating the
defendant's motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. See id. However, the Fourth
Circuit noted that the district court's procedure was inconsistent with a grant of summary
judgment. See id. at 623. The court ultimately decided that this point was unimportant
because it concluded that RemarQ was not entitled to the protection of the system storage
safe harbor. See id. at 624.
182. See id. at 624.
183. See id. The court ruled in defendant's favor with regard to direct copyright in-
fringement because the DMCA codified the rule from Religious Technology Center. v. Netcom
On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) that "liability is
ruled out for passive, automatic acts engaged in through a technological process initiated
by another." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-551(I), at 11 (1998)).
184. 239 F.3d. 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001).
185. See id.
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able RemarQ to locate the infringing material."' 86 The court miscon-
strued the statute, however. The complainant is supposed to give a
representative a list of the allegedly infringed items, i.e. the copy-
righted ones, not of the allegedly infringing ones.187 The notification
did include ALS Scan's website, but it did not include a representative
list of the infringed works. To substantially comply with the notice re-
quirements, the plaintiff should have included printed copies of the
copyrighted images, or provided a CD ROM containing the images.
As for the allegedly infringing material, the complainant is re-
quired to supply the service provider with substantially enough infor-
mation to locate and identify the material.' 88 The Senate Report
indicates that an example of sufficient information would be "a copy
or description of the allegedly infringing material and the URL ad-
dress of the webpage which is alleged to contain the infringing mate-
rial."' 8 9 Here, ALS Scan only provided RemarQ with the location of
the allegedly infringing material. It failed to include either a copy or a
description of the targeted material.
"The goal of this provision is to provide the service provider with
adequate information to find and address the allegedly infringing ma-
terial expeditiously."190 In a case such as this, where the complainant
and the service provider clearly disputed whether all of the images
were infringing, simply telling the service provider where the allegedly
infringing material might be found does not serve this goal. The ser-
vice provider would have to spend a great deal of time sifting through
thousands of images, likely not knowing what specifically to look for.
Moreover, the court acknowledged that the parties disputed not
only this issue, but also whether the sole purpose of the newsgroups
was to distribute, and thus infringe, ALS Scan's copyrighted works. 191
Despite these contested issues of fact, the court concluded that the
notice was sufficient. 9 2 However, this decision allows copyright own-
ers to deny service providers the protection of three of the DMCA's
safe harbors by filing bald, sweeping allegations of copyright infringe-
ment on the service providers' systems. Thus, this decision seems to fly
in the face of the purpose of the DMCA: to "preserve [ ] strong incen-
tives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect
186. Id.
187. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (3) (A) (ii).
188. See § 512(c) (3) (A) (iii).
189. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 46 (emphasis added).
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. See ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 626.
192. See id. at 625.
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and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital
networked environment... [and] provide[ ] greater certainty to ser-
vice providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that
may occur in the course of their activities."' 19 3
Conclusion
Congress's intent in passing the DMCA was to encourage service
providers to invest in expanding the Internet by giving them more
certainty as to the extent of their liability for copyright infringement.
In giving service providers a series of safe harbors, Congress wanted to
"ensure [ ] that the efficiency of the Internet [would] continue to im-
prove and that the variety and quality of services on the internet
[would] expand."1 94
However, an overly strict reading of the provisions of section 512
will deny service providers the protection Congress desired them to
have. If service providers are denied that protection, they will cease to
invest in Internet expansion, and individuals, such as Shawn Fanning,
will no longer have an incentive to create new technologies, like
Napster.
Congress drafted the DMCA after considering the comments of
"the major copyright owners and the major OSP's and ISP's . . . [as
well as] representatives of individual copyright owners and small
ISP's.' 9 5 After hearing from both sides, Congress struck a balance be-
tween protecting the rights of copyright holders and protecting the
rights of service providers to freely expand their technologies without
fear of liability for copyright infringement. It would not be appropri-
ate for the courts to tilt that balance in favor of the copyright owners.
The courts should give the statute the effect that Congress intended.
Ultimately, the courts should adopt the following analysis for sec-
tion 512 claims: First, a court should first make sure the entity claim-
ing immunity fits the definition of "service provider" for the particular
safe harbor that provider hopes to apply. To use the conduit safe har-
bor, it must meet the narrow definition. For all the other safe harbors,
meeting either definition will suffice. Second, the court should look to
see if the service provider meets the basic statutory requirements. The
court should consider, however, that most website operators do not
use access control measures, such as passwords, for internet users to
193. Id. at 625 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 72 (1998).
194. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
195. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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view their sites. Thus, such entities may not be able to block repeat
infringers from their services. Third, if the service provider is relying
on the system cache, system storage, or information location tools safe
harbor, the service provider must register an agent with the Copyright
Office, whose job it is to receive notice of the alleged infringement.
Fourth, the court should analyze whether the particular activities the
service provider seeks to insulate from liability meets all of the ele-
ments of the claimed safe harbor. Additionally, if the copyright owner
notified the service provider of the alleged infringement, the court
should make sure the notice was proper, and that the service provider
responded accordingly. This analysis should be done while keeping in
mind the purpose of Title II of the DMCA: to provide service provid-
ers with an incentive to continue to improve, develop, and expand the
Internet.
